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Abstract
Exponential expansion in network dimensionality and user trac has created substantial
trac congestion in Internet. This congestion causes increased delays perceived by the
users while downloading web pages. Users have considerably short patience, and when
they do not start receiving information in a short while, they stop browsing the requested
web page. As the commercial value of Internet has become prevalent, the importance
of keeping users at a site started to have direct translation into business value. Proxy
caching can alleviate problems caused by the increased user trac. In this paper, we
consider the eects of real-world non-cooperative behavior of the network agents (servers
and proxy caches) in overall network performance. Specically, we consider a system
where the proxy caches sell their caching space to the servers, and servers invest in these
caches to provide lower latency to their users to keep them browsing their web pages and
in turn to increase their revenues. We determine optimal strategies of the agents that
maximize their benets. We show that such a system has an equilibrium point when no
agent can increase it's benet by unilaterally updating it's strategy. We show that under
certain conditions this equilibrium leads to optimal cache allocation. We also show that




The Internet has expanded exponentially in network and user community size with the introduction
of the World Wide Web (WWW). With this expansion average user delay has increased due to
the increased trac over the Internet. The traditional Internet model of browsers connecting to
content servers (web sites) over the Internet is the root of the problems in Internet. Although this
simple model of users reaching distant servers for information has brought the success of WWW,
it has also become a limitation for it's development.
WWW pages have become complicated with larger size embedded objects and the users have
come to expect interactive applications. This has put substantial burden on the underlying com-
munications infrastructure which could not be improved as fast as the rate of increase in trac
demand. The business over Internet has thrived with many large and small companies making their
presence on the Internet. The business of companies became global and continuous with potential
customers from all over the world with transactions 24 hours a day. The performance of web sites
in terms of average user latency has started to translate directly into business value.
In order to alleviate the problems of trac congestion, i.e. to reduce high user latencies, user
and proxy caches are deployed. The user and proxy caches store frequently requested information,
so that the user requests do not always have to be served by the original server, which is in many
occasions already overloaded and located far from the users. User caches are implemented at the
clients and store the most recently accessed data by the users. Most modern browsers employ this
type of caches. The proxy caches (or simply proxies) are located at the network edges. Proxies
can be implemented by enterprises or Internet service providers to reduce the user latency and/or
to reduce the total trac owing in/out of the network. Original web sites may also choose to
implement proxies by storing their information partially or as a whole at the proxy sites, so that
the users can access their information more rapidly.
The serious congestion encountered in Internet has resulted in the emergence of a new type of
business of content delivery/distribution. The content delivery companies provide caching and repli-
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cation services to the web sites. Among a few of those content delivery companies are Akamai [5],
InfoLibria [9], Mirror Image [6] and Teleglobe [8]. The promise of the content delivery/distribution
companies is to allow the web sites the ability to reach users with much less congestion and la-
tency without large investment in mirror sites. This is possible by many geographically dispersed
servers installed by the content delivery companies all over the globe. These servers selectively
cache documents from the host web sites that are used to serve user requests locally.
An additional benet of this type of system is the control of the intellectual property rights. The
servers may set their content as un-cacheable for the rest of the Internet, while explicitly pushing
their content to these trusted content delivery companies.
In the literature, the metric that is used for measuring the performance of the caching systems
is the average latency observed by the users [1],[2]. This metric serves well if the requested object
has no alternatives in other servers and thus users have no incentive of ceasing to download the
object from one server and switching to another. Obviously this is not true in Internet. In the
1960s, IBM performed a study to determine how long a computer user would wait for an application
screen to refresh before becoming impatient. The answer was about two seconds. Recent studies
[3] have shown that as the latency increases users stop browsing the requested page (bail-out) with
increasing probability (Figure 1). Since the Internet becomes more and more commercially oriented,
the bail-out rate started to have a direct economic impact for the web sites. It is of interest of web








Figure 1: Bail-out rates for various download times [3].
The web sites (servers) can be considered as content providers. They make their revenue either
by selling some information content (such as news, maps, etc.) or by selling tangible products. For
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the rst type of servers, the longer the user remains on the site higher the revenue will be. For
the second type of servers, it is shown by marketing studies that when the users stay at a web-site
longer, they are more likely to make a purchase.
The necessary (but of course not sucient) condition to keep the users browsing the web site is
the timely delivery of the content. However, one can easily see from Figure 1 that the user bail-out
rate have nonlinear relationship with the retrieval time. Thus, from the content providers' view
the important metric is the minimization of the lost revenue rather than the retrieval time.
In this paper, we consider a realistic model for the relationship between the content providers
and the content distribution networks. The servers disseminate some of their content to the content
distribution networks for improved user latency. Meanwhile, content distribution networks charge
the servers for the amount of space they allocate in their proxy cache servers. However, there are
multiple content distribution networks competing with each other. We investigate the eect of
this competition on the system. Specically, we show that such a price competition leads to an
equilibrium, which under certain conditions, leads to the optimal cache allocation strategy for the
servers. This approach provides a dynamical and distributed algorithm for determining the optimal
(or near-optimal) cache content in the network.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide the details of the model of our
system. In the third section, we determine the optimal server information dissemination strategy,
and in the following section we discuss the optimal proxy pricing strategy. Since the proxies
compete among each other for the business of the servers, they update their pricies according to
their competitors' strategies. In section 5, we investigate the outcome of this competition. We dene
the server-proxy game and show that this game has a Nash equilibrium solution. We determine
certain conditions under which this equilibrium leads to the globally optimal cache allocation. In
section 6, we describe a distributed pricing algorithm based on this analysis and show that the
performance of this algorithm is better than the currently implemented caching algorithms.
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2 System Model
Figure 2 illustrates the network set-up that we are interested in this paper. Consider a network
where the users are always two hops away from the servers. Proxy caches are located between the
users and the servers. Each user belongs to a network that is served by an unique proxy cache. User
request rst arrives to the proxy cache of the user's network. If the requested object is available
at the proxy, the request is immediately served. Otherwise the request is forwarded to the main


























d : Delay between i th proxy






Figure 2: Content delivery system.
In order to reduce the expected user latency and thus to reduce the number of users bail-out and
in turn to increase the revenue, the content providers may invest in the content delivery companies
for the replication of some of their content to the sites that are closer to the users. We assume that
the content delivery companies build their proxies at the network edges, and each proxy serve the
users of that particular network. The proxies have limited sized caches which are shared among
several servers. They charge servers according to the space that is allocated to each of the server.
The request arrival rates from each network to the content providers are independent. Proxies
compete with each other for the business of the content providers. They announce their price of unit
caching space to the content providers. The objective of the proxy is to maximize it's revenue by
selling it's caching space at the maximum possible price. Servers have xed initial investment that
they spend completely for the purchase of the caching space from the proxies. The objective of the
content provider is to maximize the expected revenue generated from a user request by determining
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the appropriate cache allocation for each proxy. The server's decision depends on their relative
proximity of the proxies, the user request arrival rates from each network and the prices of the unit
cache spaces.
Assume that there are I dierent servers and J dierent proxy caches present in the network.
Let ji denote the total request arrival rate at proxy j for the content in the ith content provider.
The requests are distributed according to Zipf distribution [10]. That is, given that a request has
arrived, the probability that the request is for object h is q(h) = chi . c is the normalization constant,
and 0 < i < 1 is the distribution characteristic of the content provider i. The characterization
of user request distribution as Zipf distribution is discussed in previous studies [11], [12] and is
accepted as a good approximation to the actual web trac behavior.
The average delay (propagation and transmission) between the content provider i and the proxy
j is dij . The impact of bail-out phenomenon due to the observed user latency on the server revenues
can be eectively modeled by a system where content providers charge their users according to the
retrieval time of the objects. In this model, as the retrieval time of an object increases, the charge
for the content the corresponding user pays decreases. The content provider i charges a user of
proxy j w(0), if the user's request can be satised at the proxy, and charges w(dij), otherwise. The
pricing function w(d) is determined by the server so that the expected revenue generated when
the users bail-out with respect to some probability distribution when the observed delay is d, is
equivalent to the expected revenue generated when the users are charged according to the retrieval
time. We acknowledge that such a delay-dependent pricing strategy is not realistic. We consider
this pricing strategy only as a simple mathematical reduction to the real pricing model. Even
though these strategies may give dierent results on per request basis, on the average the total
revenue generated in either case will be equal, if the pricing function w(d) is determined as stated
above. Notice that w(dij) < w(0). From now on we assume that w(d) is available from the bail-out
rate, which is in turn determined from the marketing studies.
We can identify two types of optimization problems in this model: Servers' revenue maxi-
6
mization and the proxies' revenue maximization. We rst determine the server's optimal caching
strategy under a certain proxy pricing scheme.
3 Optimal Server Information Dissemination Strategy




i be the total
investment of the ith content provider. It is assumed that the information stored in the servers is
continuous and can be replicated continuously to a proxy. The total information available at the
server i is Ti. The server replicates its most popular part of the content to the proxies so that the
average hit rate increases. Assuming that Ci units of cache space is allocated to the server, the





. Notice that in
arriving this result we assumed that q(0) = 0.
Let pj denote the price of the unit cache space in proxy j. Let the pricing policy, p =
(p1; p2; : : : ; pJ ), denote the set of unit cache space prices of all the proxies in the network. Let
xji be the cache space allocated to server i in proxy j. If i th server's investment in the j th
















i [w(0)   w(dij)]=T
1 i
i as the gain factor for server i from proxy j.







































1=i is the unique optimal solution to the optimization problem (S).















where  is the Lagrangian constant. From Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem we know that the optimal






















Now, optimal xji can easily be determined. 
This result has been analyzed for a two servers, three proxies system, where the total investment
of each server is 20 cost units, and the sizes of the caches of each proxy is the same at 10 storage
units. Figure 3 depicts the investment of the server in a proxy when a proxy's unit cache space
price is varied, while the prices of the remaining two proxies' are kept the same. The arrival rates
to each proxy and the gain factors of each server-proxy pair are the same. The analysis does not
take into account the limited cache capacities of the proxies. The investment in the proxy decreases
8
































Figure 3: Elasticity of server investment when the cache size is innite. 2 = 0:5. 
j
i = 1;8i; j.
p2 = 4, and p3 = 7.
with the increasing price. However, more importantly the investment is quite dependent on the
distribution of requests for the server's content. In fact  = 1 represents a special case, where the
server's investment in a proxy is the same regardless of the price of the proxy.
In Figure 4, the variation of total revenue generated by a proxy server for varying proxy prices
is depicted. In this case, as the proxy lowers its price, it receives higher investment from the servers.
However, lowering the price more than a certain price reduces the revenue, because the proxy has
a limited cache space, and the request for more space from the servers can not be satised.
4 Optimal Proxy Pricing Strategy
We now consider the optimal pricing strategies for the proxies that maximize the proxies' revenues.
Let p j = (p1; p2; : : : ; pj 1; pj+1; : : : ; pJ) be the set of unit cache space prices of all the proxies in
the network except the jth one. We assume that there is no collaboration among the proxies, and
each proxy tries to maximize their revenue non-cooperatively.





i (pj) = Cj, i.e. when the proxy cache space is completely allocated.
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Figure 4: Total revenue of proxy for varying prices. 2 = 0:5. 
j
i = 1;8i; j. p2 = 4, p3 = 7.
Proof As illustrated in Figure 4, the proxy's revenue decreases when the price is either increased














i (pj) > Cj
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Cj. This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 2 suggests that assuming that the pricing policies of other proxies are given and xed,




Until now, we discussed the optimal strategies of the servers and the proxies given that system is
at a steady state. However, we have not discussed whether such a steady state exists. Notice that
when a proxy re-evaluates it's pricing policy according to the pricing policies of the rival proxies, the
remaining proxies will do the same. At each dierent pricing policy the servers' optimal investments
will be dierent as well.
In order to understand the behavior of the proxies, we model the two-stage proxy-server system
as a non-cooperative game [13]. In this server-proxy game,  (J; S; P ), the players, J , are the
proxies, the strategy set Sj for a proxy j is given by the proxy's unit cache space price and the
payo function Pj(s) of each proxy j is given by the prot of the jth proxy. This system is similar
to the Cournot oligopoly discussed in the economics literature. Assume that each proxy has a
xed cost for it's cache, but has no control over the size of the cache, i.e. the size of the cache is
determined before the system implementation.
We rst show that this game has a Nash equilibrium solution, where no proxy has incentive to
change unilaterally it's strategy, since each proxy maximizes it's own individual payo given the
strategies of others.
Theorem 1 The non-cooperative proxy-server game  (J; S; P ) has at least one Nash Equilibrium
solution.
Proof We rst show that the strategy sets are convex and compact. The prot for proxy j is
rj(p)  cj , where cj is the cost of the proxy j's cache. We will assume that there exists some price
p̂j at which demand for the cache space of proxy j is zero regardless of the prices of other proxies.
Considering the revenue curve rj(p), this is not a restricting assumption. In Figure 4, the revenue
of proxy j increases until a certain price pj beyond which it starts to decrease again. Then, we
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may limit the strategy set Sj to the interval [0; p̂j ], and still be able to cover the complete range of
payo function. Thus, the strategy set Sj is convex and compact.
The prot of each proxy is bounded from below by zero and since the total investment of
all servers is limited, the prot can never exceed
P
i Bi   cj . We assume that proxy takes its'
rivals actions as given, supposes they will remain constant, and chooses its own best course of
action accordingly. This assumption is called Cournot behavioral assumption. The payo function
under this assumption is given by rj(p). In Lemma 2, we have shown that there is an unique best
reply function, Rj(p) = argmaxpjfrj(p)g for proxy j, which is also continuous. Dene a mapping
R(s) = (R1(s); : : : ; RJ(s)). By Brouwer's Theorem [13]R must have at least one xed point s
 2 S,
where s = R(s). The denition of the best reply function Rj(s) and Brouwer's Theorem tell us
that Pj(s
)  Pj(s
=tj) for all tj 2 Sj and j = 1; : : : ; J , where s
=tj is the strategy set when the
jth proxy's strategy is changed to tj in the complete strategy set s
. This result is the denition
of Nash equilibrium. 
We have shown that there exists a set of equilibrium prices for such a system. The question
that remains to be addressed is what physical interpretation such an equilibrium has.
Consider the server optimization problem (S) discussed in the previous section. In our system,
every server tries to maximize their own revenue regardless of others, subject to the availability of





i  Cj for all proxies, i.e. servers compete for the available cache resources. Thus,










xji  Cj ; j = 1; : : : ; J:
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Theorem 2 When there is an unique equilibrium to the server-proxy game,  (J; S; P ), the equi-
librium prices solve the optimization problem Si for all servers i = 1; : : : ; I .
Proof Assume that each proxy uses the best reply function Rj(p) to update it's price. The best




i = Cj . At the equilibrium
this condition is satised as well. Furthermore, the servers calculate xji as given by Lemma 1,
which guarantees local optimality of the solution and the feasibility of the rst condition in Si.
Uniqueness of the equilibrium guarantees that the feasible solution is also the optimal solution.
Under these conditions, the outcome of server-proxy game is the solution of Si;8i = 1; : : : ; I. 
Theorem 2 states that the outcome of the non-cooperative game is the optimal solution to
the revenue maximization problem of the individual servers. This result is very important, since
it shows that a distributed resource allocation algorithm relying on this game leads to optimal
solution. Unfortunately, often there are multiple Nash equilibria and depending on the initial
prices as well as price update strategies, we may not always get the optimal solution to server
optimization problem as an outcome to our game. In the following, we discuss a special case of the
proxy cache allocation problem, where the delay between each server-proxy pair is the same and
user request arrival rates to each proxy and Zipf distributions for each server are identical. For this
case, we determine the condition for which unique equilibrium exists.
It is easy to see that if the best-reply mapping R(p) is a Contraction mapping, then the
equilibrium is unique [14]. A mapping T (p) is called contraction mapping, if jT (p) T (q)j  jp qj
for  < 1 or if the mapping is dierentiable @T (p)=@p < 1.
Lemma 3 When ji = , 8i; j and i = , 8i, then the best reply function Rj(p) is a contraction



















































































Notice that the denominator in eq. (2) is similar to the left hand side of eq. (1). Remember that















































































Notice that the condition given in Lemma 3 is not a necessary but a sucient condition which
is probably more restrictive than the necessary condition. Let Rj be the region given by the above
Lemma. Following Corollary gives the condition for optimality of the outcome of the game for the
identical case.
Corollary 1 If the range of the price vector, p, is in the region \Jj=1Rj, the server-proxy game
will have an unique equilibrium.
6 Numerical Analysis
The results given in the previous sections suggest that we may use a price-directed market-based
distributed algorithm for solving the two-stage server-proxy cache resource allocation problem. We
consider the following algorithm for this purpose:




2 ; : : : ; p
(0)
J ).
2. At iteration k, each server i calculates it's optimal cache demand for proxy j, xji
(k)
as given
in Lemma 1. Forward these demands to the proxies.







is greater than the cache capacity Cj, then the new price p
(k)
j is increased by
 from p
(k 1)
j , otherwise it is decreased by . Announce the new prices p
(k) to the servers.






= Cj ;8j, then stop, otherwise repeat from Step 2.
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In this model, the system operates as follows: An initial set of prices is announced to the
servers. The servers determine their resource (cache) demands according to these prices as well as
the request rates, and the observed delays from the proxies. The servers request these resources
from the proxies. Prices are then iteratively changed to accommodate the demands for resources
until the total demand equals to the total amount of resource available.
In this algorithm we use a very simple price update policy, where we change the price by a xed
factor, , at each iteration. We acknowledge that more sophisticated price update strategies can
be developed, which may converge to the equilibrium faster. However, we do not pursue the design
of such more sophisticated price update policies, since our objective in this paper is to demonstrate
the existence of such algorithms, as well as the benets of using them.
We compare the outcome of our algorithm with current caching systems that store the most















portion of the caching space to server i information. Notice that, in fact
this algorithm is better than the current implementation, since it considers the importance of a
particular proxy for a server. That is, if the requests of server i are mainly arriving from the network
serviced by the proxy j, proxy j gives more caching space to server i than the rest of servers.
We compare the performance of the game-theoretical and conventional caching algorithms ac-
cording to the total server revenues. We again consider the two server and three proxy system
illustrated in Figure 2. We compare the performances of two methods when the skewness of the
system is increased. For this purpose, we set several parameters xed while varying the others.
Specically, we consider the case when one of the servers receives more benet from one of the
proxies while the other server receives more benet from another proxy. We expect each of the
methods to nd the appropriate allocation that maximizes the server benets.
In this analysis we assume that the total investment of each server and the cache sizes of all
proxies are the same. Let ji = [w(0)   w(dij ]=T
1 i





























Figure 5: The percentage of improvement of using the game-theoretic algorithm over the conven-
tional caching methods. 1 = 2 = 0:1. 
j




2 = . 
j
i = 1;8(i; j) 6= (1; 1); (2; 3).
Figure 5 depicts the improvement of game-theoretic algorithm over the conventional caching
solution. In this gure we compare the two algorithms for varying request arrival rates. When the
request arrival rates are equal to 1, then the solution given by the game-theoretical algorithm and
the conventional algorithm is the same resulting in no improvement. However, as the arrival rates
become less or more than 1, we observe that game-theoretical algorithm gives better performance.
In Figures 6 and 7 we consider the performance improvement when the arrival rates are xed,
but  is varied. From the denition of ji one can notice that by varying 
j
i , basically we change
the delay between proxy j and server i. As illustrated in Figure 6, as the skewness of the system
increases the performance of game-theoretic algorithm gets better compared to the conventional
algorithm. Figure 7 also depicts the performance when the server request characteristic is varied.
That is, for the ith server the i parameter in the Zipf distribution is changed. We observe that for
larger values of i the improvement of the game-theoretic algorithm is smaller. This is reasonable
considering that when i = 1, the investment of a server is independent of the prices. In that case,
the game-theoretic algorithm's solution reduces to the conventional algorithm's solution.
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Figure 6: The percentage of improvement of using the game-theoretic algorithm over the conven-
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ji = 1;8(i; j) 6= (1; 1); (2; 3).
We also noticed that game-theoretic algorithm is worse than the conventional method for some
values of . We believe this is due to the imprecision of the simulation algorithm that we have to
accept for achieving reasonable simulation running times.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we analyzed a two-stage server-proxy resource allocation system by a market-based
approach. In this analysis, we have shown that the server-proxy game that models the system leads
to an equilibrium. And under certain conditions we have shown that this equilibrium is the optimal
solution for the non-cooperative resource allocation problem. The importance of our model is that
it closely resembles the real-world situation, where the servers and users will not collaborate to
achieve the system optimal solution. Instead every agent in the system will try to maximize their
benets without consideration of others. We have also shown that the competition among proxy
caches leads to a solution that is better than the solution provided conventional caching methods.
We are going to consider the extension of this model for the multi-stage case. We will also
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Figure 7: The percentage of improvement of using the game-theoretic algorithm over the con-




2 = . 
j
i = 1;8(i; j) 6= (1; 1); (2; 3).
11 = 
3
2 = 3. 
j
i = 1;8(i; j) 6= (1; 1); (2; 3).
examine the implications of replaceable objects. That is, when there is an equally substitutable
object in another server. In that case, when the user bails-out, it will direct its request to another
server.
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